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Vernon Lee’s Problem with Landor 
 
I.   THE STYLE AND THE MAN 
 
Vernon Lee’s only book devoted entirely to the theory and criticism of literature, The 
Handling of Words, appeared in January 1923.
1
 It was reprinted as early as March of 
the same year, and once more before the year was out. Later it became one of the 
handful of Lee’s books which made it into John Lane’s ‘Week-End Library’ series, a 
popular pocket-sized format, appearing in this edition in 1927. It would therefore 
seem to have been one of her better-known books in the decade or two after its 
publication, and it has received a significant proportion of the scholarly interest 
directed towards her non-fiction in more recent times.
2
 Like many of Lee’s other 
books, this one was made up of various essays written over a considerable length of 
time; and the chapter which alone forms my prime subject had originally been 
published twenty years earlier. It comes from a group of three essays collectively 
entitled ‘Studies in Literary Psychology’, which first appeared in The Contemporary 
Review, as a series running from 1903 into 1904. The second of these, discussing ‘The 
Rhetoric of Landor’, became chapter V(b) in The Handling of Words.
3
 
Walter Savage Landor (1775-1864), whose canonical status is lower now than 
it has been at any other time since he hit his stride in about 1798, has meant various 
things to various people. The quality, or set of qualities, for which he has been taken 
to stand have been called by various names, and submitted to varying critical 
evaluations; but Landor is eminent for having always been an author invoked as a 
model of certain stylistic values, and therefore a focus for arguments about literary 
taste. His readersip was never large: Sidney Colvin began his 1882 study of Landor 
with the averral that ‘Few men have ever impressed their peers so much, or the 
general public so little’.
4
 Still, the scope of his readership does seem to have begun 
diminishing gradually from about the start of the twentieth century, the diminution 
accelarating in the post-war period until, by now, he is hardly read at all.  
 It was at the beginning of this process of decline that Vernon Lee (1856-1935) 
expressed her frustration with Landor’s famous style. To her Landor was, in the final 
analysis, ‘an unfeeling wretch’. The charges brought seem simple enough at first 
sight, but reveal, upon closer attention, considerable complexity, some ambiguity, and 
an interesting intellectual history. In many ways her assessment would seem to make 
explicit the reasons for Landor’s decreasing popularity with readers generally. And 
yet it also shows Lee’s distance from some of the dominant critical tastes of the 
literary intelligentsia of her own time—not only of the rising generation of 
‘Modernists’ and ‘New Critics’, but even those who had been her contemporaries in 
the late nineteenth century. The clash of values between Landor and Lee is not as 
neatly emblematic as the historian of taste might inititally hope, but instead discloses 
complexities of thought and ‘feeling’ which have more than historical interest. 
My intention is to attend with some care to Lee’s analysis of Landor, and to 
examine closely the grounds for her judgements. This may seem a modest aim, 
compared with other scholars’ attempts to offer accounts of Lee’s critical theory in 
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 but I believe that the questions raised by such an apparently limited 
enquiry are important ones for the modern critic as well as for the historian of 
criticism: questions about the ideal functions of both creative and critical writing. 
Vernon Lee was an acute reader, most of whose observations remain valid and 
illuminating, even if modern scholars may not feel able to share her values or follow 
so far as her conclusions. Christa Zorn, for example, thinks that Lee was too ‘heavily 
burdened by the Victorian heritage of normative evaluations’, remarking, in an 
otherwise appreciative study, her ‘unblushing Victorian judgmentalism’ and even 
‘Victorian smugness’. Irony notwithstanding, such comments would seem to 
presuppose not only a stereotype of the ‘Victorian’ but also a normative view of what 
modern criticism is supposed to do, and against which Lee is unfairly evaluated. In 
any case, the characteristics identified by Zorn, which make Lee’s criticism 
‘antiquated and, at times, rather annoying’, are such that sympathetic modern readers, 
in her view, must try to ‘ignore’ them.
6
 Taking Lee seriously as a critic, without 
having to make these allowances, should help us, I hope, to rationalize not only her 
own structures of thought, but also their connections with the systems and habits of 
other critics—especially Walter Pater, whose influence upon serious thinkers about 
culture, art and morality has not always been impartially understood in recent 
scholarship. Her arguments may cast a different light, too, over some of the critical 
ideas we know well, and perhaps inherit, from the idioms of ‘Modernism’. To read 
her with Eliot or Pound in the back of one’s mind can prompt valuable reflections—
regarding the relation of rhetoric to poetry, for example; or the place of ‘sincerity’ in 
literature; or what we mean, and what might be meant, in speaking of the ‘objective’ 
and ‘subjective’. Furthermore, in the present period of critical history, when it is a 
little uncertain whether or not ‘the Author’ has actually died, The Handling of Words 
might provoke us to think again, in usefully unfamiliar terms, about what our 
assumptions really are concerning the roles of personality and temperament in 
literature.  
Lee’s stated aim in ‘The Rhetoric of Landor’ is to test the thesis that ‘even the 
most purely “artistic” writing is determined by the underlying temper of the man who 
writes’, and to see how far ‘this same so-called artistic quality is in reality the result 
of very human qualities or defects’ (p. 158). Landor, as the paradigmatic ‘classical’ 
stylist, is taken to exemplify what is here called ‘artistic’ writing; that is, writing 
governed to the highest degree by premeditated, acquired and controlled techniques of 
stylistic artifice, for ‘literary’ or aesthetic purposes. A reader might reasonably 
consider such writing to be comparatively impersonal, because conventionalized. Lee 
sets out to show that, on the contrary, Landor’s style arises directly from his ‘human 
qualities or defects’. After all, these are ‘Studies in Literary Psychology’, and in the 
preamble to this group of essays Lee has already explained the origins of her enquiry 
in the notion— 
 
that there may be some necessary connection between the structure of a man’s sentences and 
his more human characteristics; and that style, in so far as it is individual, is but a kind of 
gesture or gait, revealing, with the faithfulness of an unconscious habit, the essential 
peculiarities of the Writer’s temperament and modes of being. (p. 136). 
 
The emphasis on ‘temperament’—on the unconscious formal and stylistic 
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manifestations, in the artistic object, of the maker’s subjective ‘modes of being’—is 
broadly but palpably Paterian. In a certain aspect it appears simply to continue, into 
the realm of the unconscious and half-conscious functions of literary manner, the kind 
of thinking typified by Pater’s ‘Essay on Style’. If ‘the style is the man’, Pater places 
much emphasis, both in that essay and elsewhere, on ‘selection’ and ‘selectiveness’; 
and although he is often interested in the mysterious origins of aesthetic preferences, 
in the operations of ‘temperament’ and its development, nevertheless his notion of 
style focusses attention largely on what seem to be eminently conscious decisions.
7
 
Lee’s idea of style as a reliable revelation of character precisely because it is an 
‘unconscious habit’, only changes the accent somewhat. 
Another thing to consider with regard to Lee’s distinction between the 
‘artistic’ qualities of style and the stylist’s ‘human’ characteristics, is the space which 
this opens up for moral judgement. The application of moral criteria to aesthetic 
characteristics has always brought with it theoretical difficulties; but if one can track 
some elements of style back to human characteristics, understood to impinge 
inevitably upon the work, then moral judgement becomes easier: unlike the category 
of the ‘aesthetic’, the ‘human’ is the natural realm of morality. And readers of The 
Handling of Words will already be able to guess at Lee’s attitude to Landor’s moral 
character before they have even reached the fifth chapter, because in an earlier section 
of the book we find her meditating the problem of ‘literary talent’— 
 
A thing most difficult of definition, because the order of the universe, finding it vain in itself, 
has on the whole not given it a chance when separated from the human worth of the Writer. 
Yet we occasionally get a glimpse of it; [e.g.] when the mere poverty of thought and feeling, 
the vacuity of the man, as in Gautier, d’Annunzio and, I grieve to say, Swinburne and Landor, 
show it through rents and threadbareness [...] (p. 126). 
 
Landor is to be considered one of the writers in whom literary talent and human worth 
are furthest apart, or most cleanly divisible: he has great artistic qualities, but displays 
‘poverty of thought and feeling’. 
Arriving at the essay itself, we find Landor presented as ‘an unfeeling 
wretch’—or at least ‘an unfeeling wretch as soon as he dealt with pen and ink’. Here, 
then, there is a further distinction: between the human worth of the ‘man’ as man, and 
that of the ‘man’ as man-of-letters. ‘I have nothing to do with what Landor may have 
been capable, or not, of feeling under the stress of reality’, she says; but she feels able 
to demonstrate beyond doubt ‘that he was an unfeeling wretch as soon as he dealt 
with pen and ink, his own or others’ ’ (p. 173). It is in the roles of reader and writer 
that he falls short. 
 As a writer, Lee complains, Landor ‘does not allow us to feel, so anxious is 
he that we should define and determine’. Here the compaint is not that Landor does 
not himself feel (although it may amount to that), but that he prevents the reader from 
feeling. And it is precisely his stylistic fastidiousness which gets in the way. Here is 
the example she adduces: 
 
Could she (Sappho) be ignorant that shame and fear seize it (love) unrelentingly by the throat, 
while hard-hearted impudence stands at ease, prompt at opportunity, and profuse in 
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‘In this passage’, Lee writes, ‘lucidity is obtained by the distinction between prompt 
and profuse. But in the meantime poor Timid Love, who, after all, should have been 
the hero of the play, is forgotten!’ Syntactical lucidity, the well-balanced sentence, is 
a merit in itself, but for Lee it must never distract attention from the feeling. She 
makes a similar criticism of another passage, ‘one of his finest’, she says, ‘and one of 
those in which the thought of death seems to have brought some genuine emotion’. 
Here she quotes from Bossuet’s speech to the Duchesse de Fontanges in one of 
Landor’s ‘Imaginary Conversations’: 
 
[...] The beauty that has made a thousand hearts to beat one instant, at the succeeding has been 
without pulse and colour, without admirer, friend, companion, follower. She by whose eyes 
the march of victory shall have been directed, whose name shall have animated armies at the 




‘How clear and stately’, she concedes, ‘yet how wearisome! Why? simply and crassly 
because there is no feeling in it at all’;— 
 
it is all elaborately reasoned, planned out; and no man’s reasoning and planning, however 
elaborate, can replace feeling. [...]  
See how even in this passage he leaves the essential behind in order to work out a 
mere detail—“animated armies at the extremities of the earth, drops into one of its crevices 
and mingles with its dust.” Why, the earth has become the heroine of this passage, and the 
poor dying beauty is a mere adjunct to its extension, its battlefields and holes and dust. “So 
she is,” Landor might answer. But not to her own feelings, nor to ours, nor to Landor’s, if he 
had any! (pp. 167-68). 
 
Again the stately clarity is frankly conceded: if only the feeling were properly 
communicated, it would be a great achievement. Yet the final clause (‘if he had any!’) 
suggests not that the feeling is merely lost amid the overparticularities of the syntax, 
but that Landor lacked the feeling altogether. It is not simply an effect of his elaborate 
style that the feeling goes awry; rather, the stateliness of the style is, in Landor’s case, 
the real aim, and takes up both his attention and that of his reader largely because 
there is no emotional aim to interfere with it. All his ‘reasoning and planning’, which, 
if marshalled to the service of a legitimate feeling, might have resulted in a triumph of 
technique, seems empty to Lee because it appears to be an end in itself, technique for 
its own sake and not for the conveyance of feeling. And the fact of its being so 
obviously ‘planned out’, premeditated, seems to her one of its main failings, removing 
it from the heightened state of emotion required by the subject. The ‘beauty that has 
made a thousand hearts to beat’ must take emotional precedence over ‘the earth’, the 
human over the inert. 
 
II.   THE CLASSICAL MANNER 
 
In the two examples discussed above, Lee may be said to have approached the 
problem from the side of syntax; Landor’s desire to plot out balanced sentences at the 
cost, or in the absence, of any emotional motivations, is the putative characteristic 
upon which she fastens. But, of course, it is more than a matter of syntax: it has to do 
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 5 
with the appropriateness of certain locutions to the particular matter in hand, judged 
from the point of view of ‘feeling’. In other examples, she looks at the problem from 
a different angle, examining Landor’s habits of treating ‘objects’. Here the thing, the 
matter, is the prime focus, rather than the sentence structure. The author’s prior 
relationship to his content is seen to have determined his syntax, and is diagnosed 
therefrom. The problem is the same, but now she is taking a more direct route through 
the ‘artistic’ characteristics, straight to the ‘human’ question of Landor’s personal 
sense of his subject matter. 
In this line of enquiry Lee allows herself the use of the ‘arbitrary’ but 
serviceable terms, Classical and Romantic. She is not referring, as one might suppose, 
to the ‘Postscript’ from Pater’s Appreciations, but rather to Sidney Colvin’s 
Selections from the Writings of Landor.
10
 Colvin, who sees Landor as the type of the 
modern ‘classical’ writer, writes in his Preface about the distinction to be made 
between the romantic mode, ‘with its thrilling uncertainties and its rich suggestions’, 
and the classical manner, Landor’s manner, which ‘presents to us conceptions calmly 
realized in words that exactly define them, conceptions depending for their attraction 
not on their halo, but on themselves’.
11
 This is the definition, quoted by Lee, upon 
which she builds much of her argument; which is, briefly,— 
 
that these so-called classical ways of proceeding are more pretentious than efficient, that they 
are compatible with what is little better than verbiage, and that—one asserts it with awe—in 
Landor’s own work they are indicative not of the great talent he really possessed, but of his 
melancholy limitations of soul and, therefore, lapses of sense. (p. 159). 
 
The classic manner actually ‘indicates’ Landor’s human, spiritual ‘limitations’, whilst 
at the same time profiting, as far as it may, from his mere technical ‘talent’. This 
classical manner is evidently the way a person writes who is emotionally 
underdeveloped, yet highly cultured and sensitive to words. The conception of the 
‘classical’ here employed is, as Lee tells us, borrowed from Colvin merely for 
argument’s sake; it is quite at odds with her own use of the term elsewhere. To see the 
contrast, one has only to turn back to the dialogue-essay Orpheus in Rome (1894), 
where the ‘classical’ mode, exemplified by Gluck, is explained in terms of ideal 
emotional sanity, and so preferred over the ‘romantic’.
12
 Following Colvin’s meaning, 
however, she proceeds in the Landor essay to propose that, in the classical manner as 
thus determined, ‘there seems to be some underlying belief that the aim of literature is 
to tackle, so far as possible, the famous Kantian “thing in itself,” stripping it of such 
purely phenomenal wrappers and disguises as its effects.’ Of course, in her particular 
choice of terms, Lee cannot help but call up more than a memory of Kant alone: she 
implicitly sets up a distinction, not necessarily an antagonism, between the Arnoldian 
position, according to which the critic must see ‘the thing as in itself it really is’, and 
the Paterian position, according to which the first duty of the aesthetic critic is to 
‘know one’s impression as it really is’.
13
  
And then, with her usual irony, she points out that the ‘halo’ of which Colvin 
speaks ‘is evidently the value, the meaning which things occasionally take on owing 
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to their relations with poor human souls’ (p. 159). With this sarcastic flourish Lee has 
reminded her readers of the values which to her own mind have always seemed 
uppermost. Things accrue ‘value’ and ‘meaning’ through their relations to the inner 
lives of people: the relation of the inner with the outer life, the objective with the 
subjective, is what most often seems to interest her, as it had interested Pater, who 
influenced her so deeply.
14
 This interest brought her, around the turn of the century, to 
her now much studied endorsement of psycho-physiological aesthetic ‘empathy’,
15
 
although the same basic problems of correlation between subject and object, self and 
‘otherness’, had been a long-standing preoccupation, and formed, in parallel with the 
aesthetic theory, a basis of her ethical thought also. And without this sense of 
relationship—the ‘halo’ of subjectivity, the emotional associations which objects take 
from human experience and, in the ‘empathic’ process, stir up in aesthetic 
observers
16
—the objects lose value, lose meaning, become divorced from ‘feeling’.  
In Pater the relation, often fortuitous, of an object or group of objects to the 
developing inner life of a person, or even of a phase of culture, is frequently its prime 
interest;— 
 
A book, like a person, has its fortunes with one; is lucky or unlucky in the precise moment of 
its falling in our way, and often by some happy accident counts with us for something more 




Such an observation must raise serious difficulties for those who would like criticism 
to be strictly empirical and to stand outside the play of ‘happy accident’. But for Pater 
the value and meaning of certain things for certain people is often the point of entry 
into criticism, or else its final crowning theme, the realisation of it coming often in the 
form of some poignant observation or supposition which opens up the object to our 
interest. Lee, also, frequently finds in the imaginative act of sympathy with other 
people (especially the people of history) the necessary impulsion to see an object in 
the most appreciative way; works of art, places to which she travels, are generally 
given interest by human concerns and by relation to human affairs. In Hortus Vitae 
she can talk of her daily relationships with non-human others—animals, trees and 
buildings—as ‘friendships’, ‘matured by conscious courtship on our part, retracing of 
steps day by day, and watching the friend’s varying moods’.
18
 The manner which 
obliges literature to tackle the ‘thing in itself’, is fatally lacking in the human interest 
which confers meaning. Shucking things of their human values, The ‘classical’ writer 
is like a Sebastian van Storck;
19
 in seeking after an ‘objective’ view of things, which 
is, in fact, abstract (because abstracted from real human experience), he fails in the 
moral and emotional spheres.  
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Lee shares with Pater a kind of subjectivist humanism—subjectivist, yet 
committed to accuracy of perception and care for external realities. And in The 
Handling of Words, Pater’s own literary style is contrasted almost directly with 
Landor’s. In the chapter ‘On Style’, Lee had remarked that—— 
 
Pater stands half-way to Stevenson in the tendency to note rather the emotion caused by an 
object in himself than to reproduce the object and trust to its reproducing its impression. (p. 
39). 
 
Pater and Stevenson, writers particularly admired by Lee, present the subjective halo 
with the thing, or in its place; others present the thing itself and hope the reader will 
intuit the halo. Landor, in Lee’s estimation, apparently falls outside both categories: 
he presents the thing without taking account of the halo, or chooses to present things 
which, as far as he is concerned, have no haloes. 
 Landor, therefore, has made his writing emotionally barren by presenting, in 
beautiful sentences, and with perfect clarity, objects of which the human ‘values’ and  
associations have been kept away, removed, or at least neglected. And yet, Lee goes 
on,—— 
 
there is in human nature such perverse hankering after relations between things and itself, that 
when the Writer, disdainful of halos, has stripped all things into isolation, he seems to be 
obliged to weave a new set of relationships [...] (p. 160). 
 
Here she quotes from Landor’s ‘Imaginary Conversation’ between ‘Fra Lippo Lippi 
and Pope Eugenius the Fourth’ (1846): 
 
The clematis overtopped the lemon and orange trees; and the perennial pea sent forth here a 
pink blossom, here a purple, here a white one; and, after holding (as it were) a short 
conversation with the humbler plants, sprang up about an old cypress, played among its 
branches, and mitigated its gloom. White pigeons […] examined me in every position their 




Her commentary follows: 
 
The classical Writer’s refusal to tell us how the perennial pea affected Lippi, the stylist’s 
horror of saying that the perennial pea, merely was, has forced Landor, despite his singular 
sharpness of observation, into a number of amazing mis-statements [...] (p. 161). 
 
The so-called ‘classic manner’ is so incompatible with human nature that Landor feels 
impelled to bring his objects into relationship with himself, and with human concerns, 
even though they have originally been conceived without any considerable measure of 
such feeling. Consequently he must engineer these relationships by mechanical 
means. Lee then takes the resulting conceits one by one and shows that they are 
inappropriate or inaccurate. 
The main problem, the reason for this poverty of feeling and the consequent 
rhetorical figuration introduced to make up for it, is, she says, that—— 
 
Landor did not really care for what he was writing about, but only for the fact of writing. This 
is proved by his metaphors being not expressive, but explanatory; he has not felt the subject in 
those, or indeed in any, particular terms, but cast about him for parallels for better 
apprehension. (p. 167). 
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Landor’s figurative language, not being governed by any real feeling, is applied 
arbitrarily. According to Ruskin, it may be useful to recall, the ‘pathetic fallacy’ is 
inexcusable unless the speaker should be in a state of heightened emotion; to commit 
the fallacy ‘in cold blood’—Ruskin’s phrase—is a stylistic fault.
21
 Lee appears to be 
making a similar complaint. Landor’s imagery (which, in the case of the clematis and 
the perennial pea, is in fact an example of the pathetic fallacy, and of a kind Ruskin 
must have condemned) is concocted in cold blood; the conceits do not seem to have 
any basis in his, or his speaker’s, real emotional apprehension of the objects; and, in 
fact, if he had experienced any real feeling towards these objects at all, then he would 
not have needed to invent such conceits in the first place. 
 In order to consolidate her argument, Lee produces another example, this time 
one which Colvin himself had discussed: 
 
I never pluck the rose; the violet’s head   
Hath shaken with my breath upon its bank,   
And not reproached me; the ever-sacred cup   
Of the pure lily hath between my hands   




Here, she says, is ‘the method which refuses all mere subjective halos, and makes for 
the “conceptions in themselves” ’ (p. 162). In this case the reader may be less ready to 
agree. After all, Landor, or his poetic persona, is speaking here in the first person 
about his personal relationship to a number of flowering plants, and there is, on the 
surface, plenty of emotive suggestiveness. Not enough for Lee. ‘The lily’, she says, 
‘was not allowed, of course, to stir Landor’s fancy [...] It had to be considered for 
what it was! So, in order to be in legitimate relations to a verb, it was made to feel 
safe’ (p. 162). In explaining the mental process which she thinks must have decided 
Landor’s metaphor, Lee supposes both that Landor has been impelled by syntactical 
considerations (the need for a striking verb), and that he has been governed by the 
human demand to see inanimate objects in relation to human experience. Then comes 
the clinching sentence: 
 
No one can complain that these flowers are presented through the halo of Landor’s feelings, or 
that he had any feelings to present them through. (p. 163). 
 
It is part of Lee’s persona to overstate matters in this roguish way. She was, however, 
a precise writer even where most ironic. She does not actually say what at first she 
appears to be saying, that Landor had no feelings about anything, but only that he had 
no feeling through which to present the images of these flowers. That is, he had no 
feelings about the matter in hand, despite its having been of his own choosing. 
 
III.   RHETORIC AND RHETORIC 
 
It is surely not a consistent quality of what we call, according to any of the other usual 
criteria, ‘classical literature’, that it presents objects without the ‘halo’ of subjective 
human associations. But when Lee observes with disapproval that, in finding 
metaphors, Landor seems not to have ‘felt the subject in those, or indeed in any, 
particular terms, but cast about him for parallels’, she would appear to be condemning 
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a procedure or an attitude to writing which had been essential to the ‘classical’ theory 
and pedagogy of rhetoric—and, by extension, poetry—since ancient times, revived in 
the humanistic educational reforms of the Renaissance, and persisting strongly in 
classical education throughout the ‘long’ eighteenth century. The ancient rhetoricians 
and their early modern successors rarely give the impression that one’s metaphors 
must come naturally, arise directly from one’s real feeling for an object; the rhetorical 
manuals, on the whole, assume a level-headed exercise of reason in searching out the 
aptest figure. This ‘cold-blooded’ schoolroom approach is just what Lee finds so 
dissatisfying. ‘I have watched Landor at work’, she proclaims, after a passage of close 
reading:  
 
Landor, even the mighty, severe demi-god of classic prose, has appeared to me in the 
semblance of a boy provided, by heartless teachers, with a theme, and obliged to provide a 
given number of lines thereon (p. 170). 
 
If, therefore, the term ‘classical’ as used by Colvin, and so adopted in Lee’s study, 
finds its best justification when considered in relation to the classical discipline of 
rhetoric, this only brings us back to the title Lee has given to the whole essay: ‘The 
Rhetoric of Landor’. And whereas she takes up the term ‘classic’ from Colvin, the 
term ‘rhetoric’ is of her own choice, and deliberately foregrounded. She never exactly 
defines it, but it is clear enough that ‘mere’ rhetoric is to be distinguished from all 
writing founded upon genuine feeling: if one does not care for what one is writing 
about, but only for the fact of writing, then one is writing rhetorically. The ‘rhetorical’ 
and the ‘poetic’ would seem to have been at opposite ends of her scale, as we will see 
confirmed later. 
 ‘It is worth while examining and meditating on the merest technicalities of 
Landor’s writings’, she admits. ‘His structure of sentences, for instance, is both 
musically and grammatically often a wonder’ (p. 164). And there is some sensitive 
examination of particulars which show that she is willing to render up due tribute. 
‘These are high triumphs of literary craft’, she concludes; ‘but then everything, or 
nearly everything, in Landor is sacrificed to their attainment’ (p. 165). The 
implication is that Landor’s great talent was rhetorical; that, as the classical orator has 
topics supplied to him, not of his own choosing, and in certain cases (in the law 
courts, say, or the academic debate) may even be obliged to argue for positions not his 
own, so Landor, despite his free choice, appears unmoved by his own themes. His 
ingenuity cannot make poetry out of his materials, because he shows, in Lee’s own 
phrase, ‘the rhetorician’s indifference’ (p. 168). 
And yet, discussing another passage of Landor, she makes the following 
observations: 
 
What a struggle is here between reality and abstraction, and how in this confusion we utterly 
fail to know what to think, how to feel, fail utterly to receive the great Writer’s word of 
command! 
Now this word of command, or, if you prefer, this magician’s spell, making our soul 
follow with docility, making it see, hear, feel solely what and in what manner the Writer 
chooses, can be given, I believe, on one condition only: that the Writer feel very distinctly the 
moods he wishes to impart, and see in a given light and in a given sequence the things he 
wishes us to look at. (p. 164). 
 
From another point of view, this ‘word of command’ which to Lee’s mind is the 
desideratum that can make all the difference, might easily be considered a distinctive 
function of RHETORIC. The idea that a poem or novel ought to make our soul follow 
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with docility would be extremely unattractive to many modern critics and judicious 
devotees of serious ‘literary’ writing, used to the idea that poems should ‘explore’ and 
‘express’ without preaching, without delivering simple emotional hits or sentimental 
messages; and that novels should present conflicting ideas and possibilities in all their 
complexity, without simply taking up a fixed position and leading the reader 
inexorably towards it. This attitude, reinforced in the twentieth century, is more than a 
passing fad; and in the later nineteenth century Walter Pater is unquestionably one of 
the greatest exponents of a literature of ‘many-sidedness’, or ‘suspended judgement’, 
both in his fictional and non-fictional prose. He, more perhaps than any other writer 
of comparable stature in the period, deliberately presents varying ideas and 
temperaments with sensitivity and sympathy, juxtaposing diverse perspectives 
without definitively espousing any one in particular, and always allowing for ‘second 
thoughts’. And Vernon Lee generally follows him in this, using irony, dialogue and 
the ‘essay’ form to achieve, by different means, a similarly ‘many-sided’ view of 
things even in spite of the willfulness and waywardness of her literary voice. Yet here 
she is looking for the ‘word of command’ which tells us exactly how to feel. 
 In 1972 Donald Davie, incidentally (although perhaps not co-incidentally) one 
of Landor’s most important critics in the twentieth century, published an essay 
entitled ‘The Rhetoric of Emotion’, in which, thinking primarily about contemporary 
poetry, he complained of a tendency for poets to aim primarily for the delivery of 
specific sentimental cues. Davie distinguishes between ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’, and 
comes down firmly on the side of ‘feeling’:  
 
Not only is feeling anchored in the immediacy of sensuous apprehension, tactile in the first 
place; but also, because it can mean ‘groping’, it fits those artifacts that we want to applaud as 




‘Emotion’, on the other hand, implies that the the reader is being asked to ‘emote’ in a 
probably quite particular way, ‘moved’ in a certain direction, in response to particular 
‘stimuli’. Because emotion lacks the ‘tentative exploratory character’ thus ascribed to 
feeling, it provides ‘no safeguard against sensationalism’, and can too easily go along 
with the notion that the best art is that which provides the most intense emotion.
24
 In 
Davie’s terms, the ‘emotive’ aim is what he calls ‘rhetorical’, producing literature 
which simply cues emotion in compliant consumers. Lee surely cannot be a reader as 
unsophisticated and obedient as those evoked by Davie. But when Davie laments that 
‘Our schoolchildren are trained to read poems as if they were coded signals giving 
them cues about what and how to feel’,
25
 his idea of ‘rhetoric’ comes uncomfortably 
close to Lee’s ‘word of command’. And this power, in her view, is lacking in Landor 
just because he is too ‘rhetorical’ a writer. We appear to be faced with two entirely 
antithetical ideas of the rhetorical. 
 Turning for clarification to a later section of The Handling of Words, the 
chapter headed ‘What Writers might Learn’, we are forced to realise that finer 
distinctions are required, and that Lee and Davie are not so far apart as they might 
seem. She regrets that too much literature is really, upon inspection, only ‘persuasion 
and exhortation in the guise of statement’ (p. 304);— 
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the artistic processes of literature pretend to transfer facts and opinions from one man to the 
other, while most of the time they are merely transmitting orders how to act or at least how to 
feel. (p. 303). 
 
Just here she is using nearly the same language as Davie, and making a similar point. 
This persuasive function of writing she considers a ‘misuse’ of ‘literary power’ (p. 
304), and both here and later she associates it with the war-mongering of the previous 
decade.
26
 Between this ‘persuasion’ and the ‘rhetoric’ ascribed to Landor, what, then, 
is the difference? The ‘persuasive’ writer, unlike Landor, does provide a word of 
command, and may very well be working upon the emotions; but whereas the poetic 
writer, like Landor, is expected to make us think and feel for the sake of thinking and 
feeling, for the sake of art which is an enhancer of life, the persuasive writer in Lee’s 
sense is using language to alter opinion and affect the world of practical or political 
reality. Technique for its own sake is empty, but art, however closely determined by 
human characteristics and tied to human aims and moral life, must retain a degree of 
autonomy. The ‘word of command’ Lee approves is something which may enrich 
one’s experience, potentially with lasting effect and not only in the moment of 
reading. Its function, however, is decidedly not the same as ‘persuasion’, i.e. that of 
‘making people feel and act differently from how those people might be prompted by 
their own circumstances and inclinations’ (p. 306). Art-writing, in short, should not be 
a calculated effort to use words as an instrument of practical change in the opinions of 
its readers. Lee’s own way of explaining this distinction is strikingly comparable with 
Davie’s antithesis between ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’; for she distinguishes between two 
senses of the verb ‘to sway’: 
 
‘being swayed,’ as we are swayed by music, architecture, the other visual arts, by lyric and 
dramatic poetry, and even the fine spectacles of Nature, is not the same kind of swaying as 
that by eminent statesmen, preachers, journalists, and even by plain men of letters, as 
exhibited, for instance, during the war years and all the other years since Man’s Creation. (p. 
307). 
 
Instead of being made to bend to the persuasion of the writer, from ‘Art’ she wants to 
be swayed ‘in the sense of being made to live, for however brief an interlude, 
according to the heart’s desire, in the more vivid, steadier, essential and harmonious 
modes of its own invention, which means, of Art’ (p. 307).  
Davie distrusts ‘emotion’ for its own sake as the desired poetic experience. 
Lee distrusts particular kinds of emotion, strong or morbid ones especially, for purely 
artistic purposes; and indeed she does seem instictively to draw a line between 
emotion and feeling, contrasting them explicitly in her 1913 book The Beautiful, 
where she talks in one place of ‘a feeling, sometimes amounting to an emotion’, and 
later of ‘feelings’ as being ‘rudiments of emotion’.
27
 In the early essay ‘Chapelmaster 
Kreisler’, too, she had argued, thinking primarily of music, that emotion could be no 
more than suggested, and must perforce be limited, by ‘artistic form’—which ought to 
‘please’ and ‘delight’ rather than ‘move’ or ‘tickle the nerves’.
28
 There, without 
holding the terms ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’ apart from one another, she is at least 
separating the ‘stormy reign of instinctive feeling’ (akin to Davie’s ‘emotional’ 
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sensationalism) from the ‘serene’ experience of the mind under the influence of art;
29
 
and she defends the latter in the face of ‘romantic’ sentiments which prefer the 
former. This indicates her general inclinations. But then again, she expressly says that 
music is unlike poetry,
30
 and literature, she tells us, is the most ‘emotional’ art.
31
  
Ultimately, Davie finds himself attracted, not without doubts and 
qualifications, to Landor’s ‘experiment’ in restrained, ‘classical’ values, even if they 
were seldom achieved in the verse;—‘There is a certain magnificence in his obstinate 
wrong-headedness’.
32
 But Lee is left looking for a more convincing halo, more 
personalized sentiment, rejecting the values as well as the realization. She dislikes the 
sensation of being persuaded ‘how to act’ or ‘how to feel’ by rhetorical means, but 
her idea of poetic experience involves a willing surrender to a ‘magician’s spell’ 
which tells you how to feel just for the time being, during the ‘interlude’ of the 
aesthetic response. One feels reasonably justified in adding ‘and simply for those 
moments’ sake’,
33
 but with the proviso that, for both Lee and Pater, the worthwhile 
employment of individual moments in aesthetic experience ought to add up, or at least 
potentially contribute, to something of lasting value—a refinement of sensibility and 
sensitivity, in no amoral sense. But that is something quite different from, and perhaps 
opposed to, mere submission to the Persuasion that comes with outside motives. If 
Davie is suspicious of cheap thrills, so, elsewhere, is Lee; but here in The Handling of 
Words she is suspicious chiefly of argumentative opportunism, propaganda, 
brainwashing. 
Lee, therefore, does not wish for anything as tawdry as a simple emotive 
signal for the sake of ‘moving’ the reader, tickling the nerves; but she does want a 
clear and efficient mechanism through which the writer, provided he or she does 
really have some feelings about the matter in hand, can let us know exactly what 
those feelings are, and elicit the same complex of feelings in the attentive reader. 
Given her concern with the ‘human’ value of literature, there is probably also an 
implied caveat, i.e. that the feelings must be of the right sort, too. If this last criterion 
is satisfied, she is more than content to be compelled, submissive to the will of the 
writer.  
 The passage from Landor which she cites with fullest approval shows how 
delicate a thing her ‘word of command’ could be. What she goes looking for is a note 
of the genuine, a hint, however subtle, of the human halo around the images 
presented. She catches up a footnote at the end of Landor’s dialogue Leofric and 
Godiva (1829): 
 
The story of Godiva, at one of whose festivals or fairs I was present in boyhood, has always 
interested me; and I wrote a poem on it, I remember, by the square foot [sic] at Rugby. […] 




‘How oddly simple,’ says Lee, ‘and how oddly like real poetry this is! Why? Because 
Landor was remembering his own past, and, once in a way, feeling genuine emotion’ 
(p. 172). Her comment confirms the implied distinction between rhetoric and ‘poetry’, 
and she finds the latter in an ostensibly prosaic wisp of stray reminiscence. Here, at 
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last, she can feel that Landor has felt something. But there is nothing here for Davie to 
condemn.  
 
IV.   THE QUESTION OF ‘FEELING’ 
 
These appreciative remarks on Landor’s footnote remind us that, in Lee’s 
formulation, the essential ‘word of command’ can be communicated only on the 
condition that ‘the Writer feel very distinctly the moods he wishes to impart.’ This, 
perhaps, is the crux. In The Pentameron, his large-scale ‘Imaginary Conversation’ 
between Petrarch and Boccaccio, Landor places the following observation in the 
mouth of Boccaccio: 
 
I have shed tears on writings which never cost the writer a sigh, but which occasioned him to 
rub the palms of his hands together, until they were ready to strike fire, with satisfaction at 




This passage is rightly singled out by Robert Pinsky, who remarks that ‘Landor, a 
pure Romantic in so many other matters, here shocks us with a home truth about 
literary composition’.
36
 If the ‘truth’ is markedly not ‘Romantic’, is it Classical 
instead? The old distinction survives. At any rate, I concur with Pinsky’s judgement 
that Boccaccio in this case is voicing a sentiment with which Landor would not have 
disagreed. But now, jumping at once to the other end of the spectrum, and to an 
author Lee found less perplexing, let us remember what D. G. Rossetti says about this 
matter in sonnet LXI of the 1881 House of Life: 
 
By thine own tears thy song must tears beget, 
     O Singer! Magic mirror hast thou none 
     Except thy manifest heart; and save thine own 
Anguish or ardour, else no amulet. 
[...] nay, more dry 
     Than the Dead Sea for throats that thirst and sigh, 




Poets, according to this poem, must actually feel the emotion they wish to convey; the 
‘manifest heart’ must be apparent in the writing, and there is no magical amulet, no 
trick of the writer’s craft, which can do the same work as genuine ‘anguish or ardour’. 
Landor’s Boccaccio certainly suggests that the writer must think very 
carefully, must understand the feeling to be imparted; but he does not believe that the 
writer must actually feel the feeling prior to, or during, the difficult process of 
working out the best way to convey it. At first sight it might seem as though Lee were 
in full agreement with the Rossetti, and wholly at odds with the Landor. On reflection, 
we have no right to make such a definite assertion. What she says is that ‘the Writer 
[must] feel very distinctly the moods he wishes to impart’. This does not mean that the 
writer must write directly from his own experience, or must limit his literary moods to 
those with which he is familiar in his ‘real’ life. If a writer should decide to evoke or 
depict a mood, a feeling, different from those which he himself (Lee’s ‘writer’ is 
always given the masculine pronoun) has directly experienced, arising from situations 
in which he has never in fact been involved, but which, by an exercise of imagination 
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drawing upon his indirect, vicarious, sympathetic understandings of the experiences 
of those around him, he is able to realise sufficiently in himself in the moment of 
composition, then he would not be outside the parameters of Lee’s stricture. All 
things considered, Lee is certainly much closer to Rossetti than to Landor in this 
regard; but Rossetti does seem to give priority to personal emotional experience, or 
autobiographical inspiration, and Lee does not. The distinction is important. Rossetti’s 
position is also, we might note, more suitable to a writer primarily of lyric than to a 
dramatist or novelist.  
Having glanced at the extremes, I would like to position Lee in relation to the 
writer with whom she has seemed, as far as this essay has been concerned, to share 
most. Walter Pater does not make any final pronouncements on this problem, 
although he does value the ‘personal’ and the ‘sincere’ in art, using these terms in 
broad and sophisticated senses, applicable to form as well as matter. Indeed one 
would not expect to find in him such an apparently dogmatic statement of the matter 
as Lee provides several times in the space of a short essay; their literary voices are 
fundamentally different, and Pater does not speak in the self-consciously and 
ironically obstinate tones which Lee made so characteristic and subtle an idiom. His 
most sustained consideration of the matter occurs in the lecture ‘Plato and the 
Sophists’ (1891-92), where, coyly quoting the ‘intensely personal’ Rossetti—without 
naming him—on the importance of the ‘conception’ or ‘fundamental brainwork’ in 
art, he plainly enough takes Plato’s side in the debate ‘Whether it is necessary, or 
even advantageous, for one who would be a good orator, or writer, a poet, a good 
artist generally, to know, and consciously to keep himself in contact with, the truth of 
his subject as he knows or feels it’. The better answer to this question is Yes. Plato in 
the Phaedrus is really concerned with ‘truth’ as opposed to vulgar opinion, but Pater 
characteristically makes room for subjectivity in the writer’s ‘sense’ of truth (‘as he 
knows or feels it’): the formal methods of art must not break from ‘one’s own vivid 
sensation or belief’; its ‘mechanically communicable rules’ must be sanctioned ‘by 
the facts, by a clear apprehension of the facts’.
38
 Clarity does not convey 
‘apprehension’ beyond the realm of subjectivity or relativism.  
Pater shows a quite consistent preference for what might be called subjective 
reality as a basis for works of art. He would like to see the ideal style, not as ‘caprice’ 
or affectation, but as coincident with ‘the man’ only so far as it is dedicated to the 




The transcript of his sense of fact rather than the fact [...] Literary art, like all art which is in 
any way imitative or reproductive of fact—form, or colour, or incident—is the representation 




Pater seems to assume that the accomplished stylist (and he never spends much time 
writing about artists he does not admire) will always be composing in accord with 
inner and personal exigencies, with the subjective idea which determines success or 
failure by comparison with itself. The situation in which the writer might seek to 
convey a ‘mood’ without feeling it, does not seem to come into the question at all 
with him—except with regard to those ‘sophists’, and their rhetorical casuistries in the 
field of philosophy. This may be ascribed, at least in part, to the fact that Pater 
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generally does not make so strong a distinction as Lee between the matter and the 
form, and, if anything, attends primarily to the form as being the true measure and 
expression of what he calls the ‘soul-fact’.
41
 In ‘Plato and the Sophists’, it is true, he 
speaks of the sophistic vice as a habit producing ‘mere form without matter’, but the 
terms are not emphatic, nor does he continue to run with them; and in any case he is 
speaking there on behalf of Plato. On the whole, he takes a less businesslike view of 
literary ‘craft’, by no means ignoring or degrading it, but thinking much less than Lee 
in terms of the ‘things’ or ‘objects’ of a piece of writing, which take priority in the 
compositional process and then must be treated in this or that manner; indeed, that 
way of proceeding might well seem closer to the sophistic method. Yes, ‘the essence 
of all artistic beauty is expression’, which ‘cannot be where there’s really nothing to 
express’;
42
 but the selectiveness and preferences involved in the form seem, for him, 
to have been sufficient evidence of the feeling bound up in the soul-fact, and he writes 
mainly about authors in whom the craft and the feeling are presumed inextricable. He 
mentions Landor only in passing, but it seems not unlikely that he would have 
considered Landor’s style itself, the qualities Lee calls ‘rhetorical’, as the real objects 
of his feeling and ‘preferences’,—rather than the clematis or perennial pea. This 
circumstance might not have seemed to him the great failing it seems to Lee, who 
wants to see the halo around the flower, not only around the words. 
What is clear is that Lee shares with Pater a high valuation of subjectivity 
itself, of subjective views, of the ‘human’ concerns and associations which gather 
around things. Fact ‘as modified by human presence’, Pater says, is the ‘matter of 
imaginative or artistic literature’.
43
 The soul-fact is what Lee is looking for amid the 
merely prosaic facts of Landor’s garden plants, and she finds it only in the peppermint 
at Rugby—in the brief flicker of an apparently casual footnote—where for once the 
object and the feeling surrounding it both strike her as equally real, and are fully 
conjoined. 
 
The Handling of Words did not appear as a whole volume until 1923—only a 
year away from such a milestone of ‘modern’ critical theory as I.A. Richards’ 
Principles of Literary Criticism (1924), in which Lee herself is mentioned more than 
once, in slightly arch tones.
44
 She clearly belonged to the old guard, and yet was still 
important enough to warrant attention. Richards has evidently read The Beautiful with 
some interest, although he has remembered or paraphrased it with deficient care.
45
 
 Lee’s complaints about Landor do not align her with any particular group of 
critics or readers, nor do they conveniently place her as a ‘type’ within a particular 
historical moment. We have seen that she both learned and departed from Paterian 
values; and her fastidious and often quantitative literary analysis distinguishes her 
manner from that of most of the Victorian and Edwardian literary critics who 
immediately come to mind as her contemporaries. Landor had been a familiar author, 
widely admired, in the cultural world to which Lee had belonged. His reputation in 
Anglophone literary circles had remained generally high throughout the nineteenth 
century, and was renewed in the Nineties, when his stately classical restraint became a 
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marmoreal ideal for many young writers of lyric attempting to curb their instincts for 
Pre-Raphaelite or Symbolist excesses. Although by the 1920s Landor was about to be 
subject to a sharp falling off in his popularity with a general ‘literary’ readership, 
nevertheless, from the Great War onwards, the intellectual atmosphere among serious 
critics and prominent literary mandarins, increasingly associated with the academy or 
with the modern poetry ‘scene’, was in many ways inhospitable to the attitude to 
literature that Lee had demonstrated in her finding fault with Landor. This was the 
world into which The Handling of Words was released, even if its readership was, as 
it must have been, somewhat different from that of the ‘New Critics’. But the 
readership was far from entirely different: not only is she discussed in Richards’ 
Principles, but my own first edition copy of her Proteus has marginalia from its 
original owner which tells me to ‘cf. I. A. R’ on several occasions. 
Lee’s rejection of Landor, superficially a sign of the times, also shows how 
vexed was her relationship, even if she little concerned herself with it, to the spirit of 
the ascendant ‘New Criticism’ and the values of Eliotic and Poundian Modernism. 
When Eliot complains about Swinburne’s overwhelming interest in ‘words’, and 
supposed lack of interest in ‘objects’, he does not, in fact, seem very far away from 
Lee’s objections to Landor. And indeed the notion of the ‘objective correlative’—
correlating, that is, to subjective facts—is at bottom quite similar to the demand for 
objects with subjective haloes.
46
 Would The Waste Land or Pound’s Cantos be 
possible, were it not for the assumption that the poet can infuse a range of disparate 
objects and allusions with personal feeling, and so transform and unify them? But 
Eliot’s ‘Impersonal theory of poetry’, which argued that ‘Impressions and experiences 
which are important for the man may take no place in the poetry, and those which 
become important in the poetry may play quite a negligible part in the man’,
47
 shows 
an emphasis in the aesthetic ethic that implies impatience with the sort of demand Lee 
makes of Landor, even if in theory Lee might not have dismissed Eliot’s claim 
outright. The doctrine of impersonality, which separates real feeling from poetic 
feeling, cannot easily accommodate Lee’s position, even if only because it will not.  
Pound was the pre-eminent critic of Landor in the ‘Modernist’ generation. 
Later in the century, his successor in that role was arguably Donald Davie. Both 
placed a high value on the quality of ‘hardness’ in poetry, a concept first elaborated—
not exactly defined—in Pound’s 1918 essay ‘The Hard and Soft in French Poetry’. 
Landor was Pound’s prime example of ‘hardness in English’, while a secondary 
example was Lionel Johnson, himself a Landorian enthusiast.
48
 Later, in his ABC of 
Reading (1934), Pound spoke of the ‘severe classical studies’ that informed Landor’s 
‘lapidary style’; and he drew a moral: ‘A man preferring “a manner of writing” to the 
living language, runs considerable danger if he have not a culture as thorough as 
Landor’s’.
49
 This last point is likely to have given the hint to Davie, who wrote with 
some admiration about Landor’s refusal of demotic diction—in effect, a refusal of the 
Wordsworthian theory of poetic language. For him, Landor was almost a tragic hero 
of poetic style, an upholder of classical ‘urbanity’ in the face of insuperable cultural 
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change; and although Davie’s judgement is harsh, his attraction to the supposed ideal 
is felt in almost every paragraph.
50
 
  Where Eliotic ‘impersonality’ and Poundian ‘hardness’ were governing values 
in the formation of literary taste, and in the methods and inclinations of literary 
criticism, Vernon Lee’s demand for ‘feeling’, not only in the writing but in the writer; 
her pursuit of the subjective ‘human’ interest around all objects and themes, together 
with her defence of the critic’s right and responsibility, having first detected the 
‘human’ aspect of the artwork, to subject that aspect to normal moral laws of her own 
choosing, judging the ‘man’ as a component of his own creations;—these demands 
and assumptions, exhibited in her colloquial belletrist style, were bound to look old-
fashioned, even sentimental. Pound’s ‘hardness’, like many of Eliot’s basic values,
51
 
reaches back into the nineteenth century, it is true; but largely to the areas of culture 
towards which Lee had always tended to take a sceptical attitude: Symbolism and 
‘decadence’. Unlike Arthur Symons, whose reputation was rescued for the Modernist 
generation precisely because of such cultural affiliations, disowned by Lee,—and of 
course quite unlike Yeats, who had soaked up the reverence for Landor current in the 
years of the Rhymers’ Club,—Vernon Lee came to be seen increasingly as a kind of 
Victorian survivor. Or worse, a survivalist. At one point in ‘The Rhetoric of Landor’, 
she makes a humorous comment about ‘the bad taste of a man born, after all, in the 
eighteenth century’ (p. 173). If Landor, in the reign of Victoria, seemed a belated 
Augustan, Vernon Lee in the 1920s was, to many readers both sympathetic and 
dismissive, no less a representative of the preceding century. 
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